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ABSTRACT 
The Department for Transport in the United Kingdom has been a pioneer in including 
indirect benefits in the cost–benefit analysis of a transport project.  They identify three 
types of wider impacts, i.e., (1) agglomeration, (2) increased or decreased output in 
imperfectly competitive markets, and (3) labor market impacts, and provide detailed 
guidelines on how to estimate them.  Extending a differentiated product model that 
provides the microfoundations of urban agglomeration economies to include all three 
types of the wider impacts, this paper examines whether the British methodology of 
estimating the wider benefits can be justified theoretically. 
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1. Introduction 
Traditionally, cost–benefit analysis of a transport project has focused on direct benefits 
and costs such as reductions in travel time, operating costs for transport users, and 
increases in environmental costs, while ignoring indirect effects such as increases in 
regional production and appreciation of property prices.  This practice can be justified in a 
first-best world with no price distortion, but, as shown in Harberger (1964), in the 
presence of price distortions, conventional cost–benefit analysis must be extended to 
include changes in deadweight losses.
1
 
The Department for Transport in the United Kingdom has been a pioneer in including 
indirect benefits in cost–benefit analysis.  The Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk 
Road Assessment (SACTRA) started studying this issue in 1996, which has resulted in 
guidelines on the wider impacts by Department for Transport (2012).  They identify three 
types of wider impacts, i.e., (1) agglomeration, (2) increased or decreased output in 
imperfectly competitive markets, and (3) labor market impacts, and provide detailed 
guidelines on how to estimate them.  The methodology has been applied to the Crossrail 
project in London (Crossrail Ltd, 2005; Colin Buchanan and Partners Limited, 2007) and 
the HS2 high-speed rail project (HS2 Ltd, 2011), among others. 
Among the three types of wider benefits, the latter two have clear sources of price 
distortions, i.e., monopoly power and taxes, but distortions involved in the agglomeration 
benefits are not clear.  The Department for Transport (2012) note that increased 
agglomeration leads to higher productivity through its impacts on business interaction, 
labor market interaction, and freight costs, but does not identify specific price distortions.  
Kanemoto (2013a, 2013b) use a model of differentiated products in deriving second-best 
benefit evaluation criteria for transportation improvements.
2
  In a model of this type, 
agglomeration economies are derived from imperfect competition in the differentiated 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Venables and Gasiorek (1999), Department for Transport (2005), 
Graham (2005, 2006), Venables (2007), and Vickerman (2008).  Arnott (2007) studies 
second-best congestion tolls in the presence of agglomeration externalities. 
2
 These papers use the methodology developed in Behrens et al. (2010) to extend the 
Henry George Theorem to a second-best economy. 
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goods markets, and it is not clear whether the agglomeration benefits are additional to the 
second type of wider benefits.  Extending the framework in these papers to include all 
three types of the wider benefits, this paper examines whether the methodology of 
estimating the wider benefits using the Department for Transportation guidelines has 
theoretical justifications.  We also consider differentiated consumer goods in addition to 
differentiated intermediate goods, income taxes and the costs of public services to support 
residents and firms in a city, and heterogeneity of cities.
3
  We also discuss how to 
estimate the parameters required to compute the wider benefits. 
The organization of this article is as follows.  Section 2 briefly summarizes the British 
approach to the estimation of wider economic benefits.  Section 3 develops a theoretical 
model and Section 4 derives measures of indirect benefits in this model and discusses the 
practical implications of the theoretical results.  Section 5 examines difficulties in 
empirical estimation of the parameter values associated with the wider benefits.  Section 
6 contains concluding remarks. 
2. Estimation of wider economic benefits in the UK 
This section summarizes the guidelines on how to appraise the three wider benefits in 
Department for Transport (2012) and then briefly explains the estimation of the wider 
economic benefits for the Crossrail project in London. 
2.1. British guidelines on the estimation of wider benefits 
The first type of wider benefit is called agglomeration benefits (or WI1 for short).  The 
concept of effective density developed by Graham (2005, 2006) plays the key role in 
estimating them.  The effective density is defined for each subarea in a city by a 
gravity-type equation, i.e., the weighted sum of the number of workers, with weights 
determined as a decreasing function of distance.  The agglomeration benefits are 
calculated by applying an elasticity of productivity with respect to effective density.  The 
elasticity depends on industry type and it is set at 0.021 for manufacturing, 0.034 for 
construction, 0.024 for consumer services, and 0.083 for producer services.  The total 
increase in output caused by the change in effective density constitutes additional benefits 
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 Kanemoto (2013a) examines agglomeration benefits in a model of heterogeneous cities. 
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unlike in other types where only part of the increase in output represents the welfare 
change. 
The second type of wider benefit is from an ‘output change in imperfectly competitive 
markets,’ which is the welfare impact that results from increased or decreased output in 
markets where the price diverges from the marginal cost, WI3.  Although the impacts 
from increased competition, WI2, may exist in addition to WI3, the guidelines assume that 
they are negligible until there is further evidence to suggest otherwise.  The welfare 
impacts of increased or decreased output in imperfectly competitive markets are 
calculated as a fixed proportion of total user benefits to business trips, where the 
proportion, called the up-rate factor, is set to be 0.1. 
The third type, WI4, represents economic welfare impacts arising from labor market 
changes.  The labor market changes caused by a transportation project are classified into 
two types: ‘labor supply change,’ which captures changes in labor participation of 
existing residents and ‘move to more/less productive jobs,’ which reflects changes in 
employment location.  Because some of these impacts are already measured within the 
user benefits, only the ‘tax wedge’ element of the productivity increase is included in the 
welfare impacts, WI4.  The impact of ‘labor supply change’ on GDP, GP1, is estimated 
using the elasticity of labor supply with respect to effective wages net of taxes and 
transport costs.  The elasticity is estimated to be 0.1.  To estimate the impact of the ‘move 
to more/less productive jobs’ on GDP, GP3, a Land Use Transport Interaction (LUTI) 
model must be used to forecast the employment and residential relocations caused by a 
transport project.  A move from an area with a lower GDP per worker to an area with a 
higher one increases aggregate GDP. 
The tax wedge applied to the impact on GDP from more/less people working, GP1, is 
0.4 and that for the move to more/less productive jobs, GP3, is 0.3.  The tax wedges 
reflect income tax, national insurance contributions, and corporation tax.  The guidelines 
note that, in the central case, the impact of the move to more/less productive jobs, GP3, 
should be assumed to be zero, thus restricting its role to sensitivity analysis. 
2.2. Economic appraisal of Crossrail 
Crossrail Ltd (2005) estimates the wider economic benefits of the Crossrail project in 
London, following the earlier version of the guidelines (Department for Transport, 2005).  
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Table 1 summarizes the estimation results.  From this table we can see that the estimates 
of the wider benefits are quite large, equal to almost half of the conventional user 
benefits. 
The two biggest components of the wider benefits are the agglomeration benefits and 
the move to more productive jobs.  The present value of the agglomeration benefits is 
£3,094m, where the increase in output from the increase in employment density arising 
from Crossrail is estimated to be around £100 per job per annum for central London jobs.   
The wider benefits from the move to more productive jobs totals £3,232m.  This is 
based on a scenario with 5,000 additional central London jobs by 2016 and 33,000 by 
2026.  The productivity differential between central London and outer London and the 
rest of the UK is estimated to be about £10,000–£12,000 per person per annum.  The 
discounted present value of the total increase in GDP from the relocation of employment 
is then £10,772 million over 60 years.  Applying the tax wedge of 30% yields the wider 
benefits from the move to more productive jobs. 
The estimate of the benefits arising as a result of imperfect competition equals 10% of 
the benefits of work trips, which gives a present value of £486m.  
 
Table 1. Benefits and costs of Crossrail 
Benefits and costs Value (£m PV) 
Total costs 13,902 
Less net rail revenues –6,149 
Plus indirect tax reductions 1,207 
Net cost to Government 8,960 
Conventional user benefits 16,093 
Agglomeration benefits 3,094 
Imperfect competition 486 
Move to more productive jobs 3,232 
Labor force participation 349 
Total wider economic benefits 7,161 
Source: Crossrail Ltd (2005) 
 
The GDP increase arising from the increased labor force participation is valued as 21% 
of the time savings accruing to commuters, which equals £872m.  Applying the tax wedge 
of 40% yields benefits of £349m. 
Colin Buchanan and Partners Limited (2007) provided revised estimates of the wider 
benefits based on more optimistic scenarios and parameter values.  Major examples of the 
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changes are: higher employment growth scenarios, removal of the 30% cap on 
productivity gains from employment relocation, and a higher agglomeration elasticity of 
0.125 compared with the earlier one of 0.07.  These changes increase the wider economic 
benefits to £22.4bn (mid scenario). 
3. The model 
3.1. Basic structure of the model 
This section presents a simple model of monocentric cities that can produce all three 
types of wider benefits considered by the British guidelines.  In this model, agglomeration 
economies result from product differentiation in consumption and intermediate goods, 
reflecting the benefits of a larger variety of goods and services for consumers such as 
specialty shops and restaurants and a wider array of business-to-business services 
provided by financial companies, law and accounting offices, and consulting firms 
among others.
4
   
The basic structure of the model is as follows.  The economy consists of two 
monocentric cities, where all workers commute to the central business district (CBD).  
Both cities produce a homogeneous tradable good and have differentiated consumption 
and intermediate goods, where the intermediate goods are used in the production of the 
tradable good.  The tradable good can be transported between cities at no cost, whereas 
the differentiated goods are not transportable outside the city.  All production takes place 
in the CBD.  The size of the CBD is fixed and, for simplicity, the spatial configuration 
inside the CBD is ignored, except for the transportation costs of differentiated goods that 
are assumed to be uniform within the CBD.  A transportation project reduces these 
transportation costs in addition to the commuting costs of workers. 
The cities may be heterogeneous with different technological and other conditions.  
Workers and consumers are, however, homogeneous.  They are mobile and free to choose 
a city in which to live and work.  The total population (or the number of households) in 
                                                 
4
 Duranton and Puga (2004) distinguish three types of microfoundations of urban 
agglomeration: sharing, matching, and learning mechanisms.  Our framework is an 
example of the sharing model in this classification. 
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the economy is P , divided into the two cities with populations jP , 2,1j : 21 PPP  .  
We assume that absentee landlords own land in the cities. 
3.2. Allocation within a city 
This subsection characterizes the market equilibrium within a city.  Although 
production functions are generally different across cities, we omit superscript j in this 
subsection.  To avoid notational complexity, our model has only one factor of production, 
i.e., labor, but an extension to a multifactor model—such as capital and land—is 
straightforward. 
3.2.1. Consumer choice 
The utility function of a worker is  NMii xxxUu X ,}{,0  , where ix  is the consumption 
of differentiated good i, XM  is the set of available differentiated goods, 0x  is the 
homogeneous tradable good, and Nx  is the consumption of leisure.  The labor supply by a 
worker is NNN xxy  , where Nx  is the total time available for work and leisure.  The 
tradable good is taken as a numeraire. 
We assume a simple monocentric city, where all urban workers commute to the CBD, 
and the lot sizes of all houses are fixed and equal.  We ignore the structural part of a house 
and assume that the alternative cost of urban land is zero.  As noted above, the size of the 
CBD is fixed.  In this simple framework, the total commuting cost in a monocentric city 
can be expressed as a function of the population of a city P and a transportation cost 
parameter k: ),( kPTC .  If a worker is added to a city, the total commuting cost increases 
by the commuting cost at the edge because the city must expand to accommodate the new 
worker.  The commuting cost for a resident living at the edge of the city, denoted by 
),( kPT , must then satisfy: 
P
kPTC
kPT



),(
),( . (1) 
We concentrate on a symmetric equilibrium where quantities consumed are equal for 
all differentiated goods with positive consumption: xxi   for Xmi ,,1 , where Xm  is 
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the number of (or, more precisely, the mass of the set of) differentiated consumption 
goods that are actually consumed.  The utility function can be written as: 
 NX xmxxuu ,,,0 , (2) 
and the budget constraint for a resident living at the edge of the city who pays zero rent is  
),()1( 0 kPTxpmxwyt XXN  , (3) 
where w  is the before-tax wage rate, t  is the income tax rate, Xp  is the price of a 
differentiated consumption good, and labor supply Ny  satisfies NNN xxy  .  The price 
of the homogeneous tradable good is 1 because it is taken as a numeraire.  The rent 
schedule is determined such that the utility levels are equal everywhere in a city.  The 
first-order condition for utility maximization is: 
XX pm
xu
xu



0/
/
; wt
xu
xu N )1(
/
/
0



; xp
xu
mu
X
X 


0/
/
. (4) 
The price in the first equation is multiplied by Xm  because x  represents the common 
consumption level of all Xm  varieties.  The second equality shows that the marginal rate 
of substitution between leisure and the numeraire equals the after-tax wage rate.  The 
optimality condition for the variety, Xm , is in an inequality form because even if the 
consumer wants more variety, it may be constrained by the supply side conditions. 
3.2.2. Production of differentiated consumption goods 
Production of differentiated consumption good i, XMi , by a firm is denoted by iY .  
The number of varieties is Xm , which is exogenous in the short run and endogenous in 
the long run with free entry of producers.  Only one firm produces a particular variety.  
Production requires only labor input, XiXi aYcN  , where the fixed cost part is Xa  and 
the marginal cost is Xc .  The profit of a firm is then XiXii waYwcp  )( .  The 
transportation costs of differentiated goods are included in the production cost, and a 
transportation project reduces the marginal cost and/or the fixed cost. 
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Each producer is small and maximizes his/her profit, taking all the variables other than 
his/her own price as fixed.  We concentrate on a symmetric equilibrium where the prices 
and quantities of all consumer goods are equal and denoted by Xp  and x , respectively.  
The first-order condition for profit maximization implies that the price markup satisfies:  
0
1
1





XX
XX
X
wc
wcp

 ,  (5) 
where X  denotes the price elasticity of perceived demand, which is equal for all 
varieties. 
The total labor requirement for differentiated good production is:  
)( XXXXX aYcmN  ,  (6) 
and the market equilibrium in the differentiated good market requires PxYX  .  Note that 
XN  denotes the sum of labor inputs for all differentiated consumer-good producers, 
 iX NN , while XY  denotes the production of an individual producer. 
As an increase in variety benefits all consumers, the shadow price of variety for 
differentiated consumer goods is )//()/( 0xumuN XmX  .  The markup for variety 
can then be defined as: 
0


XX
XXm
m
Yp
Yp
X
X

 , (7) 
where the inequality follows from the utility maximization condition (4). 
We consider two cases: the short-run case where the variety, Xm , is fixed and the 
long-run case where it is determined by free entry of firms.  In the latter case, the zero 
profit condition of free entry is: 
)( XXXXX aYcwYp  . (8) 
Combining this equation with the first-order condition for profit maximization yields:  
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 1 X
X
X
X
c
a
Y  . (9) 
Thus, the price elasticity of perceived demand determines the production level of each 
variety.  Substituting this into the labor requirement condition, we obtain the total labor 
force in the differentiated consumption goods industry as the price elasticity multiplied 
by the fixed cost and the variety: 
XXXX maN  . (10) 
3.2.3. Production of the tradable good 
The production of the tradable good requires differentiated intermediate inputs only,
5
 
and the production function is  
YMii
yfy  }{0 , where 0y  and iy  denote the 
homogeneous final good and differentiated intermediate input i, respectively, and YM  is 
the set of available intermediate goods.  We assume that the production function is 
symmetric in intermediate inputs and that it is well behaved, so profit maximization 
yields a unique interior solution.  The final good is homogeneous, and its transportation 
cost is zero.  The mass of the set of intermediate goods that are actually used for 
production (i.e., 0iy ) is denoted by Ym  and is simply called the variety. 
We again concentrate on a symmetric equilibrium where all iy ’s are equal.  The 
production function of the final good can then be written as a function of the quantity of 
an input, y, and variety, Ym : ),(
ˆ
0 Ymyfy  .  The zero profit condition from free entry, 
  ypmmyf YYY ,ˆ , combined with the first-order condition for profit maximization 
ensures that producers choose the production scale at which constant returns to scale 
prevail: ymmyfymyf YYY /),(
ˆ/),(ˆ  .  This condition determines the scale of 
production y  as a function of variety, Ym : )( Ymyy  . 
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 Our framework of differentiated intermediate goods generalizes the model of 
Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990) from its constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) 
production function to a general functional form. 
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The choice of variety, Ym , is constrained by the entry decisions of intermediate-good 
producers.  Even if adding another variety increases profit, it may not be available in the 
market.  The first-order condition is therefore in an inequality form: ypmf YY  /
ˆ .  In 
fact, the inequality is strict in most cases. 
Symmetry makes the aggregate production function of a city particularly simple.  
Denote the total production of an intermediate good in a city by YY .  The number of 
producers then equals yYY / , and multiplying the production function of a final-good 
producer by this yields the aggregate production function: 
)(
)),((ˆ
),(0
Y
YY
YYY
my
mmyf
YmYFY  , (11) 
where 0Y  denotes the total production of the final good in a city.  Thus, the aggregate 
production function is linear with respect to the total production of an intermediate good 
in a city, and agglomeration economies arise through the increase in the variety.  The 
first-order conditions for profit maximization can be rewritten as:  
YY
Y
YY
Y
YY mp
Y
mYF
Y
mYF




),(),(
 (12) 
YY
Y
YY
m Yp
m
mYF
Y




),(
 , (13) 
where the price of the differentiated intermediate good can be written as a function of 
variety, )(/)),((ˆ)( YYYYY mymmmyfmp  , and Ym  can be interpreted as the shadow 
price of variety Ym .  Note that with the variety Ym  fixed, the price of an intermediate 
good is determined by the conditions on the final-good side only and does not depend on 
those on the intermediate-goods side. 
3.2.4. Production of differentiated intermediate goods 
Next, let us turn to the producers of the intermediate goods.  The production 
technology parallels that for the consumer goods although the parameter values (i.e., 
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marginal and fixed costs) can be different.  The labor input required for producing iY  of 
variety i is YiYi aYcN  , where the fixed cost Ya  and the marginal cost Yc  are assumed 
to be constant (measured in terms of labor units).  Given the perceived demand function, 
an intermediate-good producer maximizes the profit )( YiYii aYcwYp  .  The first-order 
condition for profit maximization and the free entry condition in the endogenous variety 
case yield the same conditions as in the differentiated consumer good case.  The only 
thing we have to do is simply to change the subscripts from X to Y in equations (5) to (10). 
3.3. Initial market equilibrium 
Free and costless migration of workers equalizes the utility levels in the two cities: 
   2222011110 ,,,,,, NXNX xmxxuxmxxu  .  The total labor supply in city j ( 2,1j ) is 
j
N
jj yPN  , which is divided between the consumption and intermediate goods sectors: 
j
Y
j
X
j NNN  .  Furthermore, the market equilibrium for a consumer good requires 
j
X
jj YxP  .  The equilibrium condition for the tradable good is: 
  0),()(
2
1
00 
j
jjjjj
N
jj
P
jj kPTCNgPgxY ,  (14) 
where jPg  is the cost of public services that an additional resident imposes on the 
government in area j and jNg  is the cost of public services associated with labor 
participation, e.g., the cost of child care for working couples. 
4. The benefits of transportation investment in a city 
We now examine the general equilibrium impacts of a marginal increase in 
transportation capacity in city 1, denoted by 1k .  The capacity increase has impacts on the 
commuting costs of workers and the transport costs of differentiated goods.  A marginal 
increase in capacity reduces the total commuting cost by 111 /),( kkPTC  .  It also 
improves intra-CBD transportation, which reduces the transport costs of differentiated 
consumption goods as well as the costs of delivering business-to-business services (e.g., 
those provided by law and accounting offices and consulting firms) by reducing the time 
costs of intra-city business trips.  The impacts of this sort are represented by reductions in 
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the marginal costs of differentiated goods, 0/ 11 dkdcY  and 0/
11 dkdcX , assuming that 
the marginal costs include the delivery costs.  The transportation improvements also have 
impacts on the fixed costs of production, 0/ 11 dkdaY  and 0/
11 dkdaX , which 
represent reductions in setup costs for producers, for example, by reducing the 
construction costs of office buildings and the costs of business start-up services.  The 
marginal direct benefit of the capacity investment is then the sum of these three types of 
impacts:  
111111
XYXY aaccT
MBMBMBMBMBDB  , (15) 
where 11 / kTCMBT   is the marginal reduction in commuting costs, and 
)/( 111111 dkdcYmwMB ZZZcZ   and )/(
11111 dkdamwMB ZZaZ  , XYZ , , are the marginal 
reductions in marginal and fixed costs of differentiated goods, respectively.  Our 
particular focus is on the indirect benefits that are additional to this marginal direct 
benefit. 
This paper concentrates on the analysis of marginal changes because integrating them 
yields discrete changes.  If a jump occurs along the equilibrium path, integration is not 
possible at the jump point, but we can deal with this by separately evaluating a change in 
welfare at that point.  
We use the Allais surplus (Allais, 1943, 1977) to measure the benefits of a transport 
project because it is simple and consistent at the same time.  We may use different 
consumer surplus concepts such as Marshallian consumer surplus and Hicksian 
compensating and equivalent variations, however, the Marshallian measure has the 
well-known difficulty of path dependence, and, as pointed out by Kanemoto and Mera 
(1985), compensating and equivalent variations yield complicated formulas in a general 
equilibrium setting.  The Allais surplus is the amount of the numeraire good that can be 
extracted from the economy with the utility level fixed.  In our model, the Allais surplus is 
given by: 



2
1j
jSS ; ),()( 00
jjjjj
N
jj
P
jjj kPTCNgPgxYS  , (16) 
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where jS  is the surplus in city j. 
We evaluate the change in the Allais surplus caused by a marginal increase in transport 
capacity 1k  in city 1.  Differentiating the Allais surplus with respect to the capacity along 
the equilibrium path and using the relationship in (1) between the total commuting cost 
and the commuting cost for a resident at the edge of a city, we obtain: 











2
1
1101
0
1
01
1
)(
j
j
j
N
j
jj
P
j
j
j
j
T
dk
dN
g
dk
dP
Tgx
dk
dx
P
dk
dY
MB
dk
dS
. (17) 
Applying the first-order conditions for utility and profit maximization and market 
equilibrium conditions to this equation yields the following proposition.  The proof is 
relegated to Appendix A. 
 
Proposition 1 (Extension of Harberger’s measure of welfare change):  The change in 
the Allais social surplus caused by a marginal change in transport capacity in city 1 
satisfies 
 


2
1
1
1
j
jj
X
j
Y GBABABDB
dk
dS
, 
where 1DB  is the direct benefit; jXAB  and 
j
YAB  are imperfect competition benefits in 
city j for the differentiated consumer and intermediate goods sectors, respectively; and 
jGB  represents the government benefit consisting of the tax benefits and public service 
costs in city j: 









11 dk
dm
m
N
dk
dY
cmwAB
j
X
j
X
j
Xj
m
j
Xj
X
j
X
j
X
jj
X X
 , 









11 dk
dm
m
N
dk
dY
cmwAB
j
Y
j
Y
j
Yj
m
j
Yj
Y
j
Y
j
Y
jj
Y Y
 , 
 
11
)()(
dk
dP
gygwt
dk
y
PgwtGB
j
j
P
j
N
j
N
jj
j
Njj
N
jjj  . 
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The indirect benefits contain imperfect competition benefits from monopolistic pricing, 
tax benefits from tax distortion, and public service costs associated with increased labor 
supply.  The imperfect competition benefits apply Harberger’s measure of welfare 
change to monopolistic price distortions in the differentiated goods sector.  The 
Harberger measure is the weighted sum of induced changes in production, with the 
weights being the corresponding price distortions.  When the variety is endogenous, we 
have to extend the Harberger measure to include the variety distortions in addition to 
price distortions.  Proposition 1 expresses this extended Harberger measure using the 
price and variety markups. 
Another component of Harberger’s excess burden comes from income tax distortion: 
the indirect benefits include increases in the tax revenue caused by changes in labor 
supply and employment location.  An increase in the tax revenue might be accompanied 
by a rise in the costs of public services.  For example, the immigration of workers may 
require additional government services, and an increase in labor supply of existing 
households might increase the need for public services such as child care.  The net benefit 
is positive only when the supply of public services involves significant increasing returns 
to scale. 
The first term in jGB  corresponds to wider benefits from more/less people working 
(GP1) in the British guidelines.  The guidelines appear to ignore two issues regarding the 
wider benefits of this type.  First, increases in public service costs to support new workers 
must be deducted from the tax benefits.  On the contrary, the guidelines assume that an 
increase in labor supply leads to reductions in benefits, which is one of the reasons why 
the tax wedge is set at 40%, as opposed to 30% for GP3 from the migration of workers.  
Careful analysis of public service costs is necessary to check whether this 10% increase in 
the tax wedge can be justified.  Second, as in the agglomeration benefits, negative 
impacts on other cities must be included in the benefit estimation. 
The second term in jGB  stands for the benefits from the move to more/less productive 
jobs impact, GP3.  As in the case of GP1, required increases in public service costs and 
negative impacts on other areas must be included.  Department for Transport (2012) 
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explicitly takes care of the second point by requiring the use of productivity differentials 
from national average GDP per worker.   
4.1. The fixed variety case 
We now examine the imperfect competition benefits in more detail.  In the short-run 
case where the varieties are fixed, the variety markups disappear and the agglomeration 
benefits are determined by price markups only.  The price distortion of a differentiated 
good induces distortion in the wage rate in addition to the income tax distortion.  This 
distortion makes the social value of labor higher than the market wage rate, whereas the 
income tax distortion causes the market wage rate to exceed the shadow price of labor for 
a worker.  In the fixed variety case, the wage markup induced by the price distortion 
equals the price markup.  This can be seen as follows. 
The total labor force requirement (6) for differentiated consumption goods and its 
counterpart for intermediate goods yield: 
);,,(ˆ XXXXX
XX
XXX
X macNY
cm
amN
Y 

 ; );,,(ˆ XYYYY
YY
YYY
Y macNY
cm
amN
Y 

 . (18) 
In this case, there is a one-to-one relationship between the output and labor input, given 
the marginal and fixed costs parameters.  Because optimization by consumers and 
producers ensures that the price of a differentiated good equals its social marginal value, 
the social marginal value of labor is XX cp /  for a consumer good and YY cp /  for an 
intermediate good.  The wage markups can then be defined as: 
X
X
X
N w
c
p
wX
  )(
1
; Y
Y
Y
N w
c
p
wY
  )(
1
. (19) 
Thus, the wage markups equal the price markups. 
Substituting (18) into the aggregate production function for the homogeneous final 
good (11) yields: 
)),;,,(ˆ();,,(ˆ0 YYYYYYYYY mmacNYFmacNFY  , (20) 
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where YYY cpNF //
ˆ   from (12) and (18).  In our model, where all production takes 
place in the CBD and the size of the CBD is fixed, the effective density can be defined 
simply by the number of workers.  The elasticity of productivity with respect to effective 
density is then: 
1
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1
ˆ
ˆ/ˆ
)/ˆ(
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N
F
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N
NF
N
N
NF
 , (21) 
where we call this the elasticity of productivity with respect to employment density.  This 
elasticity equals the wage markup (and hence the price markup) only if the wage rate 
equals the average product of labor: YNFw /
ˆ .  In such a case, the profit of a producer is 
zero: 0/  YYYY mwNYp .  If the profit is positive, then the elasticity is smaller than the 
markups: YNY Y   . 
The following proposition obtains the imperfect competition benefits in the fixed 
variety case.  The proof is in Appendix B. 
 
Proposition 2 (Fixed variety):  In the short run where the numbers of differentiated 
goods are fixed, the imperfect competition benefits in area j satisfy 
)(
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wMBMBAB
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  . 
The wage markups equal the price markups in the fixed variety case, 
j
Y
j
NY
   
and jX
j
N X
  .  The wage markup for the intermediate good is larger (smaller) than the 
elasticity of productivity with respect to employment density if the profit of a producer is 
positive (negative): 
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This proposition shows that the imperfect competition benefits are composed of three 
elements.  The first element represents reductions in the transport costs of differentiated 
goods multiplied by corresponding price markups.  This corresponds to ‘output change in 
imperfectly competitive markets,’ WI3, in Department for Transport (2012), because, 
although the terminology is general, the guidelines limit its application to user benefits to 
business trips.  The guidelines recommend estimating this by multiplying the total user 
benefits of business trips by the up-rate factor of 0.1.  If the up-rate factor equals the price 
markup, this coincides with our result.  The second element captures the additional 
benefits associated with reductions in the fixed costs. 
The third element can be interpreted as agglomeration benefits, WI1, which are given 
by the increases in labor supply multiplied by wage rates and price markups.  The wage 
markups equal the price markups in the fixed variety case.  For differentiated 
intermediate goods, the elasticity of productivity with respect to employment density is 
related to the wage markup, but they are equal only if the profit of a differentiated good 
producer is zero.  The method of using the effective density to estimate agglomeration 
benefits therefore yields a biased estimate. 
In the fixed variety case, the agglomeration benefits (WI1) as well as ‘output change in 
imperfectly competitive markets’ (WI3) are derived from output changes in imperfectly 
competitive markets.  WI1 reflects the increase in output caused by an increase in labor 
supply, whereas WI3 captures the increase in output with labor supply fixed caused by a 
reduction in transportation costs. 
The proposition shows that, in the fixed variety case, the price markups can be used to 
estimate agglomeration benefits.  Harris (1999) reports estimates of price–cost margins 
for manufacturing industries in the UK.  Many other studies estimate price markups (or 
price–cost margins) using various techniques.  These include pioneering studies by 
Appelbaum (1982), Bresnahan (1982), and Hall (1986) and a recent more sophisticated 
contribution by de Loecker and Warzynski (2012). 
When estimating agglomeration benefits, reductions in agglomeration benefits in city 2 
have to be included in the benefit estimation.  Crossrail Ltd (2005) estimates the 
agglomeration impacts only for central London, ignoring adverse effects on other areas.  
This might have caused serious overestimation of agglomeration benefits. 
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4.2. The endogenous variety case 
If the variety is endogenous and determined by the free entry of producers, the 
imperfect competition benefits are much more complicated.  We first obtain wage 
markups for workers in the intermediate goods industry because they are simpler than 
those in the consumer goods industry. 
Because the tradable good is taken as a numeraire and its price is fixed at one, demand 
for an intermediate good is particularly simple.  As shown in Kanemoto (2013a), it 
becomes a function of the variety only in a symmetric equilibrium, and the price elasticity 
can be written as a function of the variety: )( YYY m  .  Then, we can invert 
)( YYYY mmaN   to write the variety as a function of the total labor force in the 
intermediate good industry of a city: ),(~ YYYY aNmm  .  The production of a variety also 
becomes a function of the labor force YN : 
 1)),(~()/(),,(~  YYYYYYYYYY aNmcaacNYY  . 
Substituting these functions into the aggregate production function (11), we obtain a 
reduced-form aggregate production function: 
),,(
~
)),(~),,,(
~
(0 YYYYYYYY acNFaNmacNYFY  . (22) 
The wage markup can then be defined as: 
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In the same way as in the fixed variety case, the elasticity of productivity with respect to 
employment density is: 
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Because the profit of a differentiated good producer is zero, this equals the wage markup: 
YNY
  . (25) 
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The demand structure is more complicated for differentiated consumption goods than 
for intermediate goods because they are consumed only within a city.  In particular, their 
price elasticity depends on variables other than the variety, e.g., the total population of a 
city.  Because of this, the above procedure to obtain the wage markup cannot be applied to 
consumption goods.  In a special case where the price elasticity is constant, we can apply 
the same argument as in the intermediate good case.  It can be seen that the price elasticity 
of demand is constant if the utility function is of the CES form. 
The following proposition rewrites the results in Proposition 1, using the wage markup.  
The proof is in Appendix C. 
 
Proposition 3 (Endogenous variety):  In the long run where the numbers of 
differentiated goods are determined by free entry, the imperfect competition benefits for 
differentiated intermediate goods in area j satisfy  
1
)1(
dk
dN
wMBMBAB
j
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  . 
Furthermore, the markup for intermediate goods equals the degree of increasing returns 
to scale of the aggregate production function: 
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F jY
j
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j
NY
 . 
The same results hold for differentiated consumer goods if the price elasticity of demand 
is constant. 
 
If the varieties are endogenous, the agglomeration benefits include the variety markups 
in addition to the price markups.  This proposition shows that the wage markup captures 
both of them in the intermediate goods case.  Furthermore, it equals the elasticity of 
productivity with respect to employment density for the intermediate goods.  
Unfortunately, no counterpart exists for consumer goods because the utility levels are not 
observable. 
The first term in the imperfect competition benefits corresponds to the ‘output change 
in imperfectly competitive markets,’ WI3.  When the variety changes, the impacts from 
increased competition, WI2, may arise.  As seen above, the variety, ),(~ YYYY aNmm  , 
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does not depend on the marginal cost, but a decrease in the fixed cost increases the variety 
and reduces the output level of each variety.  As shown in Kanemoto (2013b) and 
replicated here, the latter effect cancels out the direct benefit completely.  The magnitude 
of the former effect depends on the wage markup and the price elasticity of demand.  The 
assumption of Department for Transport (2012) that WI2 is negligible can be theoretically 
justified for changes in marginal costs.   
Kanemoto (2013a, 2013b) show that the agglomeration benefits may be negative if 
increasing variety is anticompetitive.  In such a case, increased variety is accompanied by 
a fall in the production level of each variety, which magnifies the price distortion.  If this 
effect is larger than that of the increased variety, the net benefit becomes negative.  The 
fact that virtually all the empirical studies found agglomeration economies to be positive 
would mean that this case is unlikely to occur in reality.  
For differentiated consumer goods, agglomeration benefits include a complicated term 
that depends on the difference between the price and variety markups, whereas 
differentiated intermediate goods do not have this term in our model with symmetric 
production functions.  Intermediate goods have another convenient feature that the 
agglomeration benefits can be estimated from the degree of increasing returns to scale of 
the aggregate production function even in the endogenous variety case.  For consumer 
goods, this is not possible and some other method must be used to estimate agglomeration 
benefits.  This issue will be examined in the next section. 
5. Empirics of parameter estimation  
Next, we turn to the issue of how to estimate the key parameters of the wider economic 
benefits.  If entry of new firms can be ignored, it suffices to estimate the price markups at 
least when the source of agglomeration economies is product differentiation.  Harris 
(1999) and Davies (1999) in the SACTRA report discuss plausible values for price–cost 
margins.  Davies (1999) concludes that a typical price–cost margin is somewhat less than 
0.2, which yields a price markup of somewhat less than 0.25.  Recent estimates by De 
Loecker and Warzynski (2012) are in the range of 17–28%.  Although many empirical 
studies on price markups (or, equivalently, price–cost margins) exist, it is difficult to 
assess the reliability of the estimates because the marginal cost is not observable directly.  
 22 
More empirical research is necessary to be confident about the estimates of additional 
benefits. 
The endogenous variety case is much more challenging because variety markups are 
difficult to estimate.  The difficulty arises from the fact that the shadow price of variety is 
unobservable.  In the case of intermediate goods, however, the aggregate production 
functions of final goods yield the estimates of agglomeration economies as shown in the 
preceding section. 
There are a good number of empirical studies on urban agglomeration, with excellent 
review articles such as Rosenthal and Strange (2004), Melo et al. (2009), and Puga (2010).  
Most of the empirical studies rely on cross-sectional differences in productivity or wages, 
i.e., they are high in large/dense metropolitan areas.  It is not clear that a rise in 
employment density caused by an improvement in transportation will have the same 
quantitative impact on productivity as the cross-sectional difference between areas with 
different density levels.  The strongest evidence on this issue has been provided by 
Combes et al. (2008, 2010), which examine the effects of quality differences among 
workers.  In particular, Combes et al. (2010) shows that accounting for the endogeneity of 
the quality and quantity of labor makes the estimates of the density elasticity smaller, 
yielding an elasticity of around 2%. 
In the case of differentiated consumer goods, there is no aggregate production function 
that can be used to estimate the wage distortion.  This causes a serious problem for the 
estimation of long-run agglomeration benefits.  One possible solution is to use variation 
in housing or land prices.  Because the utility level is equalized between cities, the 
benefits of increased variety are reflected in higher land prices.  We now explore the 
possibility of using this mechanism to estimate agglomeration benefits on the 
consumption side. 
As the utility level must be equal across cities, we have: 
),();,,,1(0 jjjjj kPTuwmpE  , 
where  
 uxxxuxpmxxxwtuwmpE jNjjjjXjXjjNjNjjjjXjX  ),,(:)()1(min);,,,1( 00  
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is the expenditure function.  For a small change from a symmetric equilibrium, we have: 
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This equation can be rewritten as: 
0)1()
/
/
(
0



 jk
j
P
jj
N
jj
Xj
j
Xjj
X
j
X
jj
X dkTdPTdwytdm
xu
mu
xpdpxm . 
Applying jX
jj YxN   to this equation yields: 
 jkjjPjjjjNjjXjXjXj
X
j
X
j
X
j
m dkTNdPTNdwNytdpYm
Yp
dm
X
 )1(
1
 . 
We can estimate the variety markup jmX  from this relationship, and, combining this with 
the price markup, we obtain the wage markup.  Unfortunately, this approach has a serious 
weakness: if there are city-specific amenities other than agglomeration economies, 
separating them from the benefits of increasing variety is difficult. 
6. Concluding remarks 
Kanemoto (2013a, 2013b) examine the indirect (or ‘wider’) benefits of a transportation 
improvement in a framework with explicit microfoundations of urban agglomeration.  
This paper extends the model to include the three elements of wider economic benefits 
identified in the guidelines of the Department for Transport (2012).  Although the basic 
structure of these guidelines has a theoretical foundation, we found several points that 
might lead to biased estimates. 
First, these guidelines ignore the negative impacts on other cities when estimating 
agglomeration benefits and benefits from labor supply increases.  An increase in 
agglomeration for one city is accompanied by decreases for other cities.  Ignoring the 
negative impacts on other cities causes overestimation of the benefits. 
Second, the tax benefits of increased labor participation and relocation to high 
productivity areas are at least partially offset by increases in public service costs.  The 
guidelines assume the opposite for an increase in labor participation: a 10% reduction in 
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government costs in addition to the tax wedge of 30%.  A careful examination of public 
service costs is necessary for reliable benefit estimates of labor market impacts. 
Third, when varieties are endogenous, agglomeration benefits involve variety markups 
in addition to price markups.  Agglomeration benefits can become negative if increasing 
variety is anticompetitive. 
Fourth, the effective density approach to estimating the agglomeration benefits can be 
justified for differentiated intermediate goods if the zero-profit condition is satisfied.  In 
the fixed variety case, this leads to underestimation if the profits of differentiated 
intermediate goods producers are positive.  Furthermore, the approach cannot be applied 
to differentiated consumption goods. 
Fifth, in the endogenous variety case, a decrease in fixed costs affects market 
competitiveness because it increases the variety and reduces the production of each 
variety.  A change in the marginal cost does not have this effect, which provides a 
theoretical justification for the guidelines’ assumption that the impacts from increased 
competition are negligible. 
Many problems also exist in the estimation of key parameters such as price and variety 
markups and the density elasticity of productivity.  Especially challenging is the 
estimation of the variety markups for consumer goods.  One possible solution is to use 
variation in housing or land prices.  This approach has a serious weakness because it is 
difficult to separate the effects of differences in variety from those in other amenities such 
as climate, landscape, and culture. 
Another serious difficulty is estimating the causal relationship between density/size 
and productivity.  Combes et al. (2008, 2010) provide evidence of overestimation when 
the quality of labor is correlated with urban agglomeration. 
There are many unresolved issues left for future research.  Particularly important are 
the following two.  First, this paper analyzed only one type of agglomeration economy, 
i.e., those arising from sharing the variety of products.  We do not expect that other types 
of agglomeration economies yield drastically different results, but this is to be confirmed 
in future research.  Second, we still do not know much about agglomeration economies on 
the consumption side.  We need theoretical and empirical research on the 
consumption-side agglomeration benefits. 
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1 
Using the budget constraint (3), we can rewrite the change in the surplus as: 
  jjjjXjXjNjjjjjjjTj dPgxmpywtdxPdYdkMBdS  )1(00 . (26) 
Because the utility level is kept constant for the Allais surplus, we have: 
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Applying to this equation the first-order conditions for consumer optimization (4) and the 
definition of the shadow price of variety yields: 
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Furthermore, from profit maximization of a final good producer, we have: 
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Substituting these equations into (26) yields: 
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Now, from the labor requirement for the differentiated consumer good (6) and the 
corresponding condition for intermediate goods, we have: 
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Substituting this into (27) and using definitions of the variety markups and the direct 
benefits yields Proposition 1. 
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2 
In the fixed variety case, we do not have the variety change terms in the imperfect 
competition benefits and they are simply: 
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Y damdcYmdYcmdN   and the corresponding equation for the 
consumer good, we can rewrite these equations to obtain Proposition 2. 
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 3 
We first examine the imperfect competition benefits for differentiated intermediate 
goods.  From the definitions of ),(~ YYY aNm  and ),,(
~
YYYY acNY , we obtain: 
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Substituting these equations into the agglomeration benefits and applying the definition 
of the wage markup yields: 
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where we have used the relationship, YYYY Yca / , to obtain the third term on the 
right-hand side.  From the definitions of direct benefits, we can rewrite this as: 
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Now, it is easy to see that  ),(~ YYY aNm  and ),,(
~
YYYY acNY  satisfy:  
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Using these relationships, we can rewrite the wage markup as: 
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Substituting this into the imperfect competition benefits above yields: 
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In the constant elasticity case for consumer goods, we can follow the same procedure 
as in the differentiated good case to obtain: 
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